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ABSTRACT PAGE

This thesis examines the ways in which public reaction to the impressment of American
seam en and the perceived violation of America's neutral rights reflected the domestic
political culture of the United States between 1800 and 1808 a s well as the diplomatic
challenges the Jeffferson Adminstration faced in its relationship with Great Britain in the
years leading up to the W ar of 1812. The central focus of the thesis is the 1806 death of an
American seam en, John Pierce, while he w as serving aboard the sloop Richard. Pierce
w as killed off Sandy Hook, New York after the Richard w as fired upon by the H.M.S.
Leander, commanded by Henry Whitby. While not a victim of impressment, Pierce's death
at the hands of a Royal Navy ship demonstrated what Americans viewed as the constant
threat their countrymen faced at sea, not because of dangerous weather or work, but
because of the predatory nature of the Royal Navy. Historians have usually relegated the
story of John Pierce to footnotes in their larger examinations of the causes of the W ar of
1812. However, new spaper accounts up and down the Atlantic seaboard, as well as
diplomatic correspondence and the rhetoric of political campaigns during this era highlight
the significance of Pierce's death on the mindset of the American public and suggest the
mounting factionalism between the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans that continued
after the contested presidential election of 1800, playing itself out not only in the Court of
St. Jam es but in the streets of cities like New York and Norfolk in 1806 and 1807.
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Introduction

John Pierce’s name has cropped up in a variety of histories of the Early Republic;
however, it has usually relegated the to a footnote or a page in works on diplomatic
relations between the United States and Great Britain, the maritime culture of the Early
Republic or histories of the War of 1812. What is clear, however, is that the American
public as well as politicians at home and abroad, understood at the time the powerful
symbolism of Pierce’s death. This paper will focus on the impact of Pierce’s death on the
political culture of the Early Republic as it developed from 1803 to 1812. Right up until
the outbreak of the War of 1812, the story of John Pierce conjured up images of the
violation of America’s neutral rights, the threat of impressment faced by American
seamen and their communities at home, as well as the political factionalism of the Early
Republic when political parties used Pierce’s name to stir up emotions for or against their
platforms.
England’s King George III appointed Francis James Jackson to serve as minister
to the United States on May 26, 1809. He was sent to Washington, D.C. to replace
George Erskine, who had been working for more than a year to settle the diplomatic
difficulties that had been exacerbated between the United States and Great Britain after
the death and impressment of American sailors serving on board the U.S.S. Chesapeake
in June 1807. President James Madison was interested particularly in deriving some
satisfaction from the punishment to be meted out to the commanding officer of the
H.M.S. Leopard, whom the American government believed to be responsible for the most
recent act of aggression against American naval and merchant ships and seamen.
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Secretary of State Robert Smith had expressed his and the President’s disappointment in
the concessions Erskine had been willing to make on behalf of his government, most
notably that the Leopard's commander, Captain Salusbury Price Humphreys, had gone
unpunished other than to be given the command of another ship.1
In October 1809, Jackson renewed efforts to settle the matter of the Chesapeake affair ,
“on the basis of the proposal of his predecessor.” By November 13th, Jackson had circulated a
letter to his government and to British consuls in the United States that he had removed himself
from Washington, D.C., and would remain in New York “to wait for His Majesty’s commands,”
since Smith had made it clear that he would not accept any more correspondence from Jackson.
Word of the letter had reached President Madison, as well as both houses of Congress by
December. Newspapers reported by the end of that month that both the Senate and the House of
Representatives had resolved to approve the Madison Administration’s decision to end
discussions with Jackson. In those debates, both in the House and the Senate, the members
reminded each other of the wrongs committed by the British government at the hands of the
Royal Navy. American shipping remained vulnerable all over the world and so did American
sailors. Neutral rights meant nothing and the actions taken by the previous administration and by
Congress had backfired. Federalist member Elisha Potter of Rhode Island reminded his
colleagues that “all our restrictions on our commerce operate in [Great Britain’s] favor.” He
continued, “We have been insulted and plundered for fifteen years past by the belligerent
nations.” The time had come for action, and on this at least, the members of both parties could
agree, even if they could not all settle on the same method. Republican Samuel McKee of
Kentucky asked, “What course was left for the Administration to pursue? Why sir, to either hang

1 Jam es Zim m erm an, Im pressm ent o f Am erican Seam en (N ew York: Kennikat Press, 19 6 6 ) p. 152.
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down their ears like the sluggish ass, and bear with patience Mr. Jackson’s flippant sarcasms, or
cut them off in the manner they have done?”2
In the midst of these debates, members of Congress, such as Jonathan Fisk of
New York, invoked “the murder of Pierce” to convince his colleagues on both sides of
the aisle to resolve to support President Jefferson’s actions against Jackson, eventually
culminating in the demand for his recall. Invocations such as Fisk’s had been going on
in the chambers of government, the columns of American newspapers, and at the tables
of taverns and political meetings since April 1806 to remind the public of the death of an
American seaman, John Pierce. Pierce had been killed as a result of the actions of a
Royal Navy ship, the H.M.S. Leander, when it fired on Pierce’s sloop, the Richard for
failing to come to when ordered do so outside of New York harbor. That event was
followed just over a year later by the deaths of more Americans when the H.M.S.
Leopard fired a broadside at the U.S.S. Chesapeake in Norfolk, Virginia. In both cases,
the Royal Navy justified its actions by claiming to be looking for contraband, and more
importantly, deserters. It was the British government’s failure to make what the U.S.
deemed to be appropriate reparations in that case that led to weeks of debate in both
houses of Congress in December 1809, setting the stage for a declaration of war against
England in June of 1812.
The thesis begins with a preliminary chapter on scholarly opinion since Theodore
Roosevelt, not on the death of John Pierce, but on British deprecations against American
seamen generally in the years leading up to the War of 1812. Chapter two covers Pierce’s
death, the trial of Captain Henry Whitby, master of H.M.S. Leander, that followed, and
especially American public opinion about Pierce and Whitby. The thesis ends with
2 Annals o f C ongress, H ouse o f R ep resen ta tiv es, 11th C ongress, 2 nd S essio n (1 8 0 9 ), p. 75 9 , 778
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conclusions about the meaning of the death of John Pierce as one of the key factors, now
largely forgotten, that propelled the United States into war again England in 1812.

5

Chapter I: War of 1812 American Seamen and Anglo-American Scholarly Opinion

Two years after graduating from Harvard, twenty-four year old Theodore
Roosevelt made a name for himself as a historian by completing and publishing his Naval
History o f the War o f 1812.

In it, Roosevelt highlighted the naval supremacy of the

British Royal Navy on the eve of the so-called second war for American independence,
having devastated the navies of Russia, Denmark, the Netherlands, France and Spain.
Biding their time, the ships of His Majesty’s Navy spent the years after the Napoleonic
Wars trolling European ports and trade routes in order to protect the mercantile interests
of Britain and her colonies.

According to Roosevelt, the British viewed the Americans

as young upstarts, with a navy of no real consequence and therefore, no real threat to the
Royal Navy. By doing this, the British navy had committed an error similar to the one
made by their own army during the early years of the Seven Years War. Roosevelt
argued that it was the British underestimation of the American ships at sea combined with
“efficient ships and, above all, efficient men in them” that provided for an American
victory.1
What made the American seaman ready for battle was not extensive experience
fighting at sea. The American navy was in its infancy, had cut its teeth battling Barbary
pirates at Tripoli and the world’s oceans during intense storms. The Royal Navy
certainly had the upper hand when it came to combat experience on the high seas. And
ethnically, according to Roosevelt, there was little difference between the two warring
sides: “On the New England coast the English blood was as pure as in any part of

T h e o d o r e R oo sev elt, The N a v a l W a r o f 18 1 2 (N ew York: M odern Library, 19 9 9 ) p 15-16.
2 R oosevelt, N a v a l W a r o f 18 12 , p. 17.
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Britain”.3 In fact, Roosevelt added in a footnote that the War of 1812 was “practically a
civil war.”4 So what made the American sailor ready to stand up against Europe’s most
powerful navy? “Thrown upon his own resources, he had learned self-reliance; he was a
first-rate practical seamen, and prided himself on the way his vessel was handled.”5 It
was not simply the nature, but the character of the American sailor that was nurtured in
the ports of Annapolis and Baltimore and the oceans of the Atlantic and Pacific that set
them apart. Roosevelt echoed the strong nineteenth-century belief in American
exceptionalism: the work ethic and self-sufficiency that would guarantee the success of
the United States Navy. “It was, perhaps, the Navy alone that thought itself a match, ship
against ship, for Great Britain. .. . The officers of the navy, with their strong esprit de
corps, their jealousy of their own name and record, and the knowledge, by actual
experience, that the British ships sailed no faster and were no better handled than their
own, had no desire to shirk a conflict with any foe, and having tried their bravery in
actual service, they made it doubly formidable by cool, wary skill.” Thomas Jefferson
may have envisioned an American future embodied by the independent farmer, but
Roosevelt understood that the descendants of the island nation they were fighting grew
up by the sea, “off in a fishing dory almost as soon as he could walk.”6
Yet it wasn’t simply genes that prepared them for naval battle against their
cousins across the pond. Roosevelt first mentions a cause for the War of 1812 early on in
his naval history and stresses the significance of the British practice of impressment,
emphasizing the irony of that fact:“[B]y a singular turn of fortune,
3 R oosevelt, N a v a l W a r o f 18 1 2 , p. 16.
4 R oosevelt, N a v a l W a r o f 18 1 2 , p. 16.
5 R oosevelt, N a v a l W a r o f 1812, p. 17.
6 R oosevelt, N a v a l W a r o f 1812, pps. 17-18.
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Great Britain, whose

system of impressing sailors had been one of the chief causes of the war, herself became,
in consequence of that very system, in some sort, a nursery for the seamen of the young
Republican navy.”7 While American seamen “feared nothing more than being impressed
on a British ship,” they nonetheless persevered. In fact, according to Roosevelt, more
American sailors served (and were therefore trained) on Royal Navy ships in the years
before the War because of impressment than served in the U.S. navy at the same time.
Without impressment, therefore, perhaps the Royal Navy would not have engaged such a
formidable enemy when the time came. And ironic still, it was their shared ethnic
heritage that put American seamen at risk of impressment in the first place.
Jesse Lemisch’s groundbreaking work on the role of the American Jack Tar in
setting the stage for the American Revolution is essential for understanding the nature of
the relationship between American seaman and the Royal Navy in the years before the
War of 1812. According to Lemisch, the practice of impressment had been part of
English maritime culture since before the Magna Charta and lasted for more than six
centuries for the simple reason that it was cheaper than paying a wage that would have
attracted men to the work in the first place. “Doubts occurred about its legality, and even
more about its morality, but no one ever contended that it would be cheaper for the
o

Crown of England to hire its sailors at a full wage.” Not only was the pay bad, but the
punishments for misconduct were worse on board ships where corporal punishment was
common place. Seamen suffered from malaria and scurvy until the late eighteenth

7 R oosevelt, N a v a l W a r o f 18 1 2 , p. 19.
8 J esse Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull: The Role o f N e w York's Seam en in Precipitating the Revolution (N ew
York: Garland Publishing, 1 9 9 7 (rep.)) p. 16.
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century.9 In an environment like this, death was an ordinary part of life, whether from
shipboard illness, infections caused by the lash or the threat of death in battle. After all,
these sailors were serving in the Royal Navy during times of war.
Not surprisingly, with conditions as distasteful as those faced by the seamen,
desertion in the Royal Navy was a constant problem, one that they solved through the use
of press gangs. Americans were already familiar with this practice before the
controversies started brewing at the time of the Napoleonic Wars. Lemisch argues that
the Royal Navy resorted less and less to impressment in the nineteenth century, claiming
that the “Royal Navy was willing to employ men for work in tolerable conditions and for
proper wages,”10 but this was clearly not the case, at least as long as Britain and France
remained at war. American ships and sailors were targeted by the Royal Navy, searching
for contraband and deserters on board merchant ships flying the stars and stripes of the
United States.
Lemisch also found that not only were seamen affected by the press gangs, so was
the colonial economy in port cities such as New York. Rumors about the arrival of Royal
Navy press gangs would turn cities like New York and Boston into ghost towns as men
stayed away to avoid the press. “Thus those who did not lose their liberty to impressment
lost their property to it.”11 In this way, urbanites and seafaring men and women alike
began to construct a shared identity that would align them politically in the years leading
to the American Revolution. This shared mentality developed in the early 1800s as the

9 For a discu ssion o f scurvy and th e discovery o f m e a su res to p reven t it during th e Age o f Sail, s e e
S tep h en R. Bow n, Scurvy: H o w a Surgeon, a M a rin e r an d a G entlem an Solved the G reatest M ed ica l
M ystery in the Age o f Sail (N ew York: 2 0 03 ).

10 Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull, p. 17.
11 Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull, p. 18.
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Royal Navy resorted to impressment once again, this time patrolling both the seas and the
ports looking for deserters and contraband.
In Lemisch’s even more well-known essay, “Jack-Tar in the Streets,” published in
the William & Mary Quarterly in 1968, he deals with the problem of class while
attempting to understand the culture of American seamen. Culling through British
admiralty laws, colonial statutes, as well as the memoirs of men who had spent time at
sea, Lemisch views seamen, considered “wards” of the Admiralty court, as a special case
whose very words, movements, alcohol consumption, and time ashore were controlled by
the ships’ masters. He describes this relationship as paternalistic and argues that men on
board American ships were bound as much by class as those on land. Most seamen were
not allowed to vote. Statutes prohibited actions that would harm the interests of the
ships’ masters, even at the expense of their crews. In this way, seamen, regardless of
their race, were subjected to harsh treatment and “unfreedom” in much the same ways as
African-American slaves.

1

In Lemisch’s second examination of American seamen, he once again emphasizes
that most Americans suffered because of the treatment of sailors at the hands of the press
gangs. After all, he writes, “just about everyone had a relative at sea.”

1 'X

But as he also

points out, not all Americans responded in the same way or for the same reasons.
Colonial governments reacted because merchants suffered when ships refused to enter
their ports, afraid of losing their own crews to the press gangs. Their supplies of goods
diminished and in turn they were forced to raise prices. During the Napoleonic Wars,
Americans complained loudly about the political and economic consequences of
12 J esse Lemisch, "Jack Tar in th e S treets: M erchant S ea m en in th e Politics o f R evolutionary America" in
W illiam & M a ry Q uarterly 25 (1 9 6 8 ) p. 380.

13 J esse Lemisch, "Jack Tar in th e Streets," p. 381.
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impressment and ship seizures, but rather than decrying the actions of the rowdy seamen
who protested their treatment, they joined in, at least in print.
Linda Colley notes that the ethnic background that so many Americans shared
with their British counterparts in the Royal Navy, both during and after the Revolutionary
War, complicated the relationship between captors and captives. “Whether British or
American, they had to deal with opponents whose skin colour and clothing was often the
same as their own, and who might well speak the same language, worship the same
Protestant God, react and think much of the time in very similar ways.” This was the
case both during the Revolution and the years that followed. “So the imaginary wall that
normally descends in war brutally separating one side from the other proved in this one
sometimes markedly unstable. Men and women would glance at those who were in name
and fact their enemies, and find themselves staring at a mirror.”14
The Americans, who had grown up reading the captivity narratives of their fellow
colonists who had been captured by Native Americans, now composed their own stories
of captivity, recognizing the lack of difference there as well. Colley relates the stories of
captured American seamen brought to England during the 1770s. The novelty of the
presence of these victims among English society soon wore off when “To satisfy the
curiosity of some ladies, who had never seen a Yankee, as they called me. I went in, and
they seemed greatly surprised to see me look like an Englishman; they said they were
sure I was no Yankee, but like themselves.”15 However, Colley notes that in most of
these kinds of narratives, descriptions like the one above were followed by accounts of
incidents where “the reverse was true.” Instead, it was often the captive sailors who

14 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire & the World, 1 6 0 0 -1 8 5 0 , (N ew York: A nchor Books, 20 0 4 ) p. 217.
15 John Blatchford, q u o te d in Colley, Captives, p. 218.
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noted the differences between themselves and their captors, usually concluding with
some kind of description of their patriotism and unbounded loyalty to the American
cause, highlighting their independence even as they were held captive. In this way, as we
will see in the case of the Americans impressed during the era of the Napoleonic Wars,
their actions became politicized—in this case by themselves, in other cases, by the
American public who supported them.
Jesse Lemisch first suggested that it was not only the sailors who faced
impressment whose actions were politicized when they rebelled against their treatment at
the hands of the Royal Navy, but the American public as well, especially those who lived
in cities along the Atlantic. This was particularly true in the years leading up to the
American Revolution and helped to fuel the fires of resentment toward the British in
cities like Boston as tensions began to rise in the 1770s. For many merchants, the impact
was financial. Ships refused to sail to certain ports under threat of being boarded by
Royal Navy cruisers or having their crews kidnapped while on shore. The economy
suffered too. If goods were not delivered to American cities, than supplies often ran short
and prices rose as a consequence. So even while Lemisch pointed out that protests
against impressment was a matter most Americans could back because most families had
someone at sea, the impact on the colonists’ pocket books was surely felt just as
seriously.16
As far as colonial governments were concerned, however, while the press gangs
and Royal Navy were at fault, the political response of local legislatures and governors
was not meant to forge an alliance between seamen and the colonial state, but to protect
local economic interest and to preserve order. In Boston, in the 1740s for example, the
16 Lemisch, "Jack Tar in th e Streets" p. 38 5 .
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legislature took action to change the conduct of the Royal Navy while protecting law and
order along with the city’s maritime economy. This was the proper way to stage a
protest, not through violence or mob action, which was clearly part of the story. “The
House spoke for the merchant, not the seamen.”17 Boston mobs rioted for two days in
response to Commodore Charles Knowles’ efforts to press men into service on board his
ship in 1747. According to both Lemisch and Pauline Maier, impressment became even
more common in the years following the Seven Years War. Lord Admiral Alexander
Colville, former commander in chief of British vessels in North America, ordered his
ships to press men into service from Maine to Delaware in 1764, and as Maier points out,
“mobs met the ships at every turn.”18 By 1775, the British often used impressment as a
means to punish colonists in port cities from Maine to Virginia for their increasing
resistance to British authority.19
We shall see whether this was the case decades later, during the Napoleonic Wars,
when local and state governments dealt with the Royal Navy and British government not
as British colonists, subject to the authority of Parliament and king, but as representatives
of the sovereign United States. In the 1790s, British merchants complained when the
press gangs sailed into town that they too suffered economically. “Merchants were soon
complaining that sailors were in such short supply that sixty ships bound for the
Caribbean and other destinations could not sail.”20
The British, in turn, politicized the practice of taking prisoners. While we
normally associate this with prisoner exchanges, Colley includes the act of imprisoning

17 Lemisch, "Jack Tar in th e Streets" p. 3 8 7
18 Pauline M aier, "Popular Uprisings in America" in W illiam & M a ry Q uarterly 27 (1 9 7 0 ) p. 9.
19 Lemisch, "Jack Tar in th e Streets" p. 39 3 .
20 N athan Miller, Broadsides: The Age o f Fighting Sail, 1 7 7 5 -1 8 1 5 (N ew York: W iley, 2 0 0 1 ) p. 107.

13

colonists as well. A year after the war ended, the British government began to refer to
captives taking in the war with the American colonies as “prisoners-of-war.” Before that,
they were officially referred to as “the King’s misguided subjects.” As Colley notes, the
difference in meaning was clear. To acknowledge the captives as prisoners of war was to
acknowledge the independence of the colonies and the prisoners as agents of this new
state. Britain defended her actions by claiming that treasonous subjects would have faced
much more “savage penalties conventionally visited on rebels” rather than what Colley
believes were the true political motives of the language employed by the Crown.

91

Colley’s discussion of the treatment American captives received at the hands of
the British during the American Revolution is revealing for the proximity of these acts to
the events leading up to the War of 1812. Stories about British cruelties toward
American “patriots” circulated for years in American newspapers, taverns and wherever
working men gathered, even after the war ended. The Napoleonic Wars and the
increased pressure the Royal Navy felt to man their ships was less than a quarter century
removed from those cruelties. Most Americans had a long memory when it came to their
war for independence. In a nation, too, where so much of the population had been young
when the war was fought, they were still around in 1803 to remember 1776. And those
who led the fight, not only on the battlefields, but in the chambers of Independence Hall,
had become the leading men of the Early Republic.
These leading men took sides in both domestic affairs and foreign relations,
particularly in the 1790s and 1800s. The United States sought to avoid becoming
embroiled in European affairs in order to concentrate on domestic concerns as the
fledgling nation worked to established both economic and political stability in the years
21 Colley, Captives p. 21 9 .
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following the Revolutionary War. Unfortunately for the young nation, the desire for
economic development often led directly to involvement in the ways and wars of Europe.
The country found itself taking sides more than once during its first three presidential
administrations.
Much recent scholarship has focused on the question of impressment and its
impact on the political and economic cultures of the Early Republic. Denver Brunsman’s
recent essay entitled, “Citizens vs. Subjects: Impressment and Identity in the AngloAmerican Atlantic,” examines the ways in which Americans formed a conscious
delineation between their status as citizens of the United States and their understanding of
the relationship of a British subject to the authority of the Crown.

00

•

•

Brunsman highlights

the fact that by the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, the federal government had begun to
provide sailors with protection papers, establishing their status as American citizens. It
became clear to the Royal Navy, relatively quickly, that forged documents were being
carried by British subjects to avoid press gangs and seizure on board American merchant
ships. Brunsman points out the it was true that there were many British sailors
“disguising” themselves as Americans by carrying fake protection certificates, and that
the existence of these falsified documents, the British government argued, justified the
search and seizures conducted by the Royal Navy. They simply had no choice. In order
to conduct successfully their war against Napoleon, the Royal Navy had to resort to
impressment to man their ships.
The rhetoric of revolution, according to Brunsman, took on a special kind of
meaning for the maritime community in the Early Republic. Few Americans experienced

22 D enver Brunsman, "Citizens vs. Subjects: Im p ressm en t and Identity in th e A nglo-A m erican Atlantic" in
Journal o f the Early Republic 3 0 (20 1 0 ).
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the physical consequences of “subjecthood,” (in this case compulsory naval service) in
quite the same way as seamen. Members of the Federalist Party argued that Thomas
Jefferson and his fellow Republicans overstated the extent to which impressment affected
the American public (that really only a small number of Americans were pressed into
service in the early 1800s), politicizing it to cause a breach in the relationship between
the United States and Great Britain. But Brunsman’s real focus is the way in which the
actions of the Royal Navy contributed to Americans’ national identity. “To be an
American citizen was a choice, not an obligation.” All kinds of Americans could back a
war with Britain in 1812 not because they had family members who had been impressed,
but because the violation that American seamen suffered at the hands of the Royal Navy
(in actuality or in theory) was a threat to the liberties of all American citizens. It was the
freedom from that kind of coercion at the hands of their own government that set them
apart from their British cousins.
Other historians, Brunsman notes, have downplayed the political fervor expressed
by the American public as reported in the Democractic-Republican newspapers of the
Early Republic. He describes these public expressions of outrage and opposition reported
in the press as links in the chain of a developing national identity. But Americans were
not simply identifying themselves against what they termed the “subjecthood” of Britons,
they were drawing political lines at home as well. Even if the Republicans were willing
to use impressment as a way to gain political support among those men who could vote,
most of those affected most intimately by the practice of impressment were not
traditionally those with a political voice. They were the descendants of the mobs who

16

protested impressment during the colonial era, the ones whom colonial legislations
condemned for being unruly and impolitic.

17

Chapter II: The Death of John Pierce and the Trial of Henry Whitby

Jesse Pierce described the incident that took place on Friday, April 25, 1806
between his ship, the Richard and the H.M.S. Leander commanded by Captain Henry
Whitby in an affidavit sworn before New York City’s Mayor DeWitt Clinton on the
following day. Pierce, master of the Richard, stated that at about 5:00 in the evening, as
the ship was approaching Sandy Hook, about a quarter mile from the shore, “two shots
were fired at different times by a large British ship of war with two tier of guns supposed
to be the Leander.” The first shot landed short of the Richard, while the second flew
beyond the vessel by about 40 yards. The Leander had time to send a third shot toward
the Richard, striking the “tassel rail and the quarter rail, and killed immediately the man
at the helm named John Pierce,” the brother of the deponent, Jesse. Jesse Pierce stated
that he was then able to “enter the hook without any further molestation.”1
A second affidavit was sworn to by the master of the brig Sally. Hezekiah Pratt
affirmed that there were three Royal Navy ships at the entrance to the hook and that
“upward of a hundred shots were fired at the said vessel by the said ships of war.” He
could not attest to the fact of John Pierce’s death, however, for he “had no personal
knowledge” o f the injury to Pierce or any other deckhand. His own ship was about 330
feet away from the Richard when the incident took place. That same day, Mayor Clinton
submitted the affidavits to the City Council which quickly resolved, in light of the
“atrocious murder of a citizen of the United States and the daring aggression upon our
national rights” to pay for the costs of interring John Pierce on Monday, April 28th. The
Council members stated their intention to attend the funeral “in a body” and requested
1 The M o rn in g Chronicle (NY), April 28, 1806.
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that “the captains of all American vessels in the harbour to hold their colors half-mast”
that day. Bells were to ring throughout the city to commemorate not only Pierce’s death,
but to draw attention to the national dishonor suffered by Americans at the hands of a
British naval captain who had violated the country’s neutrality rights.
Following Pierce’s death, the seafaring community kept a close eye on Whitby’s
movements. The British too, were concerned about his well-being, quite from the start.
“This affair is of so delicate a nature, and so much involves the character of a meritorious
officer, that we ought to be cautious of prejudging it upon the materials before us.” The
papers announced that Captain Whitby had been indicted by a New York grand jury on
murder charges. When Henry Whitby died in the summer of 1812, the National
Intelligencer reported his death: “Henry Whitby, age 30. . . who commanded the
Leander. . . when she fired on one of our coasters and murdered John Pierce, an
American sailor.

He was later promoted for this HUMANE and honorable act to the

command of his majesty’s ship, Britonl”

Perhaps that kind of rhetoric was not

surprising given that the war with Britain had commenced a month before, but clearly the
memory of John Pierce continued to be imprinted in the minds of Americans as it was
reprinted in their newspapers seven years after his death.
In that same year, 1812, a fictional account of the trial written by William
Sampson featured Henry Whitby being brought before the grand jury, whose members
included “Stephen Seeclear”, “Jonathan Feamot”, and “Jasper Trueblue” on March 17,
1807. Sampson, an Irish barrister and a Protestant, who had arrived in the United States
after being deported first from Ireland and then from England for his participation in the

2 M o rn in g Chronicle (London), June 4 ,1 8 0 6 .
3 N a tio n a l Intelligencer (W ash in gton , D.C.) July 2 8 ,1 8 1 2 .
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Irish Rebellion of 1798, his support of Irish Catholics in that rebellion, and as a member
of the United Irishmen, described Whitby as standing “mute” and picking his teeth with a
toothpick pulled from his pocket and humming a “couplet of which the only words I
could hear were “Britannia” and “bulwark.” Clearly, Sampson imagined a Whitby with
no respect for the law. Sampson’s prosecutor asks the jury to consider two points: first,
whether Whitby “occasioned] the death of John Pierce” and secondly, “Did he kill him
of malice aforethought?” 4
Not only did Captain Henry Whitby face charges in the U.S. but he was also
brought before a Court Martial on board the H.M.S. Gladiator docked in Portsmouth
almost a year after the incident at Sandy Hook took place. He appeared before the Court
on April 17 and 18, 1807.

Whitby had submitted a report of the incident to his

commanding officer at Halifax, Admiral John P. Beresford, on May 6, 1806.

The

commissioners who recommended the inquiry stated that “an American seaman was
unfortunately killed” when a sloop failed to adhere to a first shot fired to warn a number
of American ships that they needed to come round to be boarded. They believed that an
inquiry was warranted because of concerns that Whitby had violated the neutrality rights
of the United States, “a state in amity with his Majesty.” But Whitby was also tried for
the “willful murder” of John Pierce, a “citizen of the United States” who had been
“feloniously killed and murdered” by a shot fired from the Leander, under Whitby’s
command.
tV»

In his letter dated, April 30 , Whitby expressed to Bereford his concern that some
o f his men had been detained because of their participation in the events of the 25th. “I

4 William S am p son , Trial o fC a p t. H enry W hitby, f o r the m u rd er o f John Pierce, w ith his dying declaration
(N ew York: 1 8 1 2 ) p. 19-22.
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am much surprised that the officers sent on the service should have been so unlawfully
kept. . . You, sir, must be well aware, that the death of that unfortunate seamen could not
be attributed to them, or to any other cause but accident.”5 Despite this denial, the Royal
Navy determined that Whitby should face the tribunal. Appearing to give evidence
against Whitby were several American sailors, including Jesse Pierce, the brother of the
seaman killed in the incident. Jesse Pierce was asked to describe the incident for the
Court. He testified that he could see three ships as he was coming into Sandy Hook from
the south and that his own ship was not alone. He described the action taken first by the
Cambrian, “as he got in just at the back of the middle ground.. . she fired and brought
several vessels to, and then stood offshore with her head to the eastward.”6
It was at this point that the Leander, Whitby’s vessel, sailed in even closer than
the Cambrian “firing all the way at several vessels.” Pierce explained that one shot
landed in front and one in back of the Richard, “this caused me to think she was firing at
me.” He next brought the ship to, but before the crew of the Richard could get the
mainsheet aft, the Leander fire again, hitting the tassel-rail and quarter-rail.” This
testimony echoed the one Pierce gave to the magistrate in New York the previous year.
His brother was killed, according to Pierce, by the shot that hit the quarter-deck. He
closed by saying that he got the ship into port between 8 and 9 o’clock and “informed the
consul.”7
After his statement, Pierce was questioned by the Court and cross-examined by
Whitby. He was asked the time of the incident and how far from the beach the ship was
5 H. W hitby to J.P. B eresford, April 3 0 ,1 8 0 6
6 T estim on y o f J esse Pierce, "M inutes taken at a Court M artial a ssem b led on board His M ajesty's Ship
G ladiator in P ortsm ou th Harbour" in The N a v a l Chronicle 18 (Jun-Jul 180 7) a c c e sse d on July 15, 2 0 1 0 at
h ttp ://w w w .r o y a l-n a v y .o r g .
7 T estim on y o f J esse Pierce, "M inutes tak en at a Court Martial."
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at the time. The Richard according to Pierce, was about half a mile from the shore, while
the Leander was a mile and a quarter beyond the Richard. Pierce was asked if he knew
Captain Whitby. He replied that he did not know him “at the time my brother was
killed.” He had not heard an order to fire, nor did he know if Whitby was on board the
Leander at the time. He conceded, when asked, that someone else might have given the
order to fire. He testified that he had been standing within six feet of his brother when he
was killed and saw that he had been struck “under the jaw.” He was asked once again the
name of the ship that fired on the Richard. “It was from the Leander, as I am informed, I
did not know the ship, it was the largest of the three.” When given the opportunity to
cross-examine Pierce, Captain Whitby asked whether any other ships were firing. Pierce
answered that he could not say, but when pressed further, he told Whitby that he did not
o

believe that either of the other ships were “within gun shot.”
The trial continued with the testimony of Caleb Brewster, captain of the Vigilant,
Jonathan Lewis Brewster, an accountant at the New York Customs House, and a New
York branch pilot, Robert Mitchell. Brewster had been sailing near Sandy Hook on the
tVi

morning of April 25 . At half past ten, he “discovered three men of war. .. they bore
about S.E. betwixt one, two, and three leagues distance.” Later that afternoon, he saw a
number of sailing vessels moving up along the Jersey shore heading for Sandy Hook. He
also saw the three men of war, the Leander, the Cambrian and the Driver, head toward
the shore. He stated that he “knew the ships, I have been all around them fifty times.”
The Leander passed the Cambrian and “began to fire on the brig Sally.. . and the sloop
Richard.” Brewster testified that the Leander fired about 10 shots before the Driver
joined in and fired several times. “I don’t know what she fired at: she then hove about
8 T estim on y o f J e sse Pierce, "M inutes taken at a Court Martial".
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and stood to the southward and the eastward, in the same direction the other two had
done.” 9 He saw the hole in the Richard's mainsail and watched the sloop head toward
New York.
When questioned, Brewster said that he did not see the shot from the Leander hit
the Richard, but that it was “the only ship firing at the time.” He stated too, that the
Leander was the only ship that fired at the Richard and the Sally. The Court was trying
to determine the distance between the ships and the shore.

Brewster’s testimony

corroborated Pierce’s, but the Court questioned Brewster further: “Do you know the
distance of the jurisdiction of the States from the shore?” Brewster answered, “Three
miles, I believe.” When asked how he knew this, he answered, “I understood that was the
treaty as made by Mr. Jay.”

Clearly skeptical that Brewster should have firsthand

knowledge of the details of the Jay Treaty, the Court asked if he had read the treaty, to
which he replied, “Yes, I have read them all.”
The Jay Treaty was signed in November 1794. It was primarily a commercial
treaty that provided for the regulation of trade between the United States and Great
Britain. Its connection to Whitby’s trial, however, had to do with the establishment of
neutral rights should one of the parties go to war. The treaty was one of the first attempts
on the part of the new federal government to negotiate with the British to deal with
unfulfilled aspects of the Peace of Paris in 1783.

The United States was still waiting

for the British to abandon posts in the western territories now claimed by the Americans.
The Jay Treaty was also meant to settle the maritime disputes that continued between the
two, particularly to protect American seamen from impressment and to protect American
shipping and trade. So the parties agreed to a “treaty of amity, commerce, and
9 T estim on y o f Caleb B rew ster, "M inutes taken at a Court Martial".
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navigation.”10 The treaty deepened the lines of faction that were beginning to take shape
in the United States and that played themselves out in the press over the death of Pierce
and other seamen. These are generally considered to be the primary causes of the War of
1812 as well. The Federalists continued to support negotiation with the British, while the
Jeffersonian Republicans were inching their way toward an embargo of British trade.
The Jay Treaty did not provide for a “distance of jurisdiction of the States from
the shore” as Brewster was questioned about by the tribunal at Whitby’s court martial. It
did, however, state that “the subjects and citizens of the two nations shall not do any acts
of violence or hostility against each other.” 11 By invoking the Jay Treaty, Brewster could
simply have meant to remind the tribunal of the promises the two countries had made to
each other when the treaty was signed in 1794.
Donald Hickey argues that, while flawed, the Jay Treaty enabled American
commerce to truly develop during the last decade of the 18

tVi

century, with exports

jumping from $33 million in 1794 to $94 million by 1801. Not only that, but the treaty
protected the United States from a “nation whose naval power could menace the United
States.”

For Hickey, the only downside of the treaty was its impact on American

relations with France, “who regarded it as a betrayal of the alliance that had bound them
to the United States since the Revolution.” The United States was forced to test its navy
out against the French, not the British, in order to secure commercial interests,
particularly in the West Indies. The Quasi War with France ended in 1800, resulting in a
promise from the United States not to seek reparations for losses incurred at the hands of

10 "Treaty o f Amity, C om m erce and N avigation b e tw e e n His Britannick M ajesty and th e U n ited S tates o f
A m erica by their P resid en t w ith th e A dvice and C on sen t o f their S e n a te (Jay's Treaty)" (1 7 9 4 ) A ccessed
S ep tem b er 5, 2 0 1 1 . h ttp ://a v a lo n .y a le .la w .e d u /1 8 th _ c e n tu r y /ja y .a sp .
11 Article XXI, Jay's Treaty (1 7 9 4 ).
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French ships in exchange for being released from the treaties signed at the end of the
Revolution.12
The Napoleonic Wars would lead the United States down that often treacherous
diplomatic path once again in 1803, when hostilities between France and Britain
resumed. Most scholars agree that it was the endless need for what seemed an endless
supply of men to serve aboard Royal Navy ships that led to the problem of impressment
•

in the first place.

IT

British naval commanders were given orders to patrol the seas

looking for deserters or for British men impressed into American service. Hickey points
out that American ships did seek out British sailors from time to time to join their crews
when they were undermanned. This was a direct result of the expansion of American
commercial interests and overseas trade in the years following the American Revolution.
The evidence clearly suggests that British seamen were willing to join American crews
because the pay and the working conditions were universally known to be better than
what the Royal Navy and even British merchant ships could offer.14 Treasury Secretary
Albert Gallatin estimated that “perhaps half the able-bodied seamen in the American
marine” were actually British sailors. The laws of naturalization which were simple and
clear to the Americans, were denied by the British, who argued that a man did not “shed
responsibilities to his native land by migrating to another.”15
The British justified their actions quite simply, especially early on. Refusing to
accept the concept of naturalization on constitutional and sanguinary grounds, the British
12 D onald R. Hickey, The W a r o f 1812: A Forgotten Conflict (Illinois: 1 9 95), p. 6-7; Jam es F. Zim m erm an,
The Im pressm ent o f Am erican Seam en, p. 116; Bradford Perkins, The Cam bridge History o f Am erican
Foreign Relations, Vol. I (Cambridge: 1993), p. 1 2 3 -1 2 5 .

13 S e e B runsm an, "Subjects vs. Citizens"; Robert E. Cray, Jr., "R em em bering th e U.S.S. Chesapeake: The
Politics o f M aritim e D eath and Im pressm ent" in Journal o f the Early Republic 25 (Fall 2 0 05).
14 Hickey, The W a r o f 1812, p. 11.
15 Perkins, Cam bridge History o f Am erican Foreign Relations, Vol. 1 p. 1 2 1 -1 2 2 .
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believed that once you were bom a British subject, no act of law could change that status.
You could not be naturalized as the citizen or subject of another government. This, they
argued, was a simple matter, particularly when it came to those seamen who had been
bom before the onset of the American Revolution. By 1803, this would have meant any
man who was as young as twenty-years old, since to be an American one had to be bom
in the country since 1783.16 There were men on board American merchant ships who
would have been in their teens.

This did not necessarily make them safe, however,

because the shared ethnic traits of British and American seamen, who spoke the same
language (more or less), worshipped the same God, and drank the same rum, often made
it difficult for American sailors to prove their citizenship.

What a young Theodore

Roosevelt had seen as an advantage for American sailors in the war threatened their
status and safety in the years leading up to it.
In an attempt to protect vulnerable sailors, the federal government passed the “Act
for the Relief and Protection of American Seamen”, which provided for the issuance of
Seamen’s Protection Certificates. The certificates were issued locally by the customs
collectors at ports throughout the country. Seamen had to request the certificates and
they were granted only after proof of citizenship was provided and 25 cents were paid.
Eventually, the men only had to bring a witness willing to swear before a notary that they
were who they claimed to be. Sailors aboard merchant ships were not required to carry
them. The certificates included the sailor’s name, age, place of birth, and distinguishing
physical features. A certificate issued for Timothy Snow in 1805 out of New Bedford,

16 Jon Latimer, 1 8 12 : W a r w ith A m erica (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2 0 0 7 ) p. 17.
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described him as “light complection, has a small scar on his left hand.”

17

•

•

The British

government claimed they were very easy to forge and so rarely recognized them as
legitimate.
Press gangs were given their numbers and sought to hit those targets swiftly. Jon
Latimer describes “nearly 1,000 seamen were taken in a single night” on the Thames. 18
Within twenty years, the Royal Navy had grown from 16,000 to 145,000 men by the War
of 1812. Impressment was the best solution to the manning problem the Navy faced
because crews on board merchant ships were already trained, and, as Latimer points out,
“the Royal Navy itself provided little training.” Desertion was clearly a problem for the
Royal Navy as well. The men sought on board the Chesapeake a year after Pierce was
killed by the Leander were suspected of being deserters. Rather than being a result of the
poor conditions and harsh treatment seamen faced aboard Navy vessels, Latimer argues
that it was better economic opportunity more than anything else that convinced men to
desert. Why enlist with the Royal Navy for an indefinite period of time, risk loss of rank
or pay, or wait for months if not years to be paid in the first place? As a consequence of
the needs of the Royal Navy, American seamen found themselves relatively easy prey,
particularly after 1803.The Whitby trial continued with the defendant given an
opportunity to cross-examine Caleb Brewster. Again, Whitby tried to establish that no
one could positively attest to whether the shot that resulted in Pierce’s death came from
the Leander. “Do you mean positively to swear, that the shot fired from the Leander was
directed at the sloop in which John Pierce was killed?” In other words, could Brewster
confirm that this was a premeditated act on the part of Whitby and his crew? Brewster’s
17 S ea m en 's P rotective C ertificate o f T im othy Snow , M artha's Vineyard M u seu m , a c c e sse d 9 .1 5 .1 1
h ttp ://w w w .m v m u se u m .o r g /in d e x .p h p
18 Jon Latimer, 1812, p 16 -1 7
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testimony described the event in much the same way as Jesse Pierce had, that the shots
had landed in front of and behind the Richard, the ships’ distance from each other, and
the ships’ distance from the shore. Next, Whitby took another route to establish his
innocence. He asked whether the American merchant ships had brought to close enough
for the British boats to board them to search for deserters and that those ships, not the
Richard were the intended targets of the Leander's warning shots, but to no avail.
Brewster continued to affirm that to the best of his knowledge, the shots were fired by the
Leander and that the Richard was the target.
Finally, Whitby addressed the question of jurisdiction. “You have stated to the
court, you have considered the neutrality three miles from shore, do you know that I was
furnished with such instructions?” Brewster answered that he did not know. “How long
since is it the treaty was made, or was it in existence at the time the Leander was there?”
asked Whitby. Brewster answered, “I judge it was.” Finally, Whitby asked Brewster if
he knew whether any other treaty between the two countries was in effect at the time of
the incident.

Brewster replied, “I do not know; it was said that Mr. Munro was

negotiating in this country; but what was done I don’t know; it was the opinion at that
time.”
James Monroe had served as U.S. minister to the Court of St. James since 1803.
By 1805, he was increasingly frustrated by the treatment American vessels received at the
hands o f the Royal Navy. Over fifty ships had been seized by the British and it was
Monroe’s responsibility to advocate for the ships’ owners and crews and submit protests
on their behalf to the British government. In a letter dated August 20, 1805, Monroe
wrote to Secretary of State James Madison about a recent meeting with the British
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Foreign Secretary, Lord Mulgrave.

Mulgrave had served as Foreign Secretary since

January of that year, and Monroe had met with him several times to discuss the seizure of
th

American vessels. Monroe had complained to Mulgrave as recently as the 16 of August
that the British response to American protests was unsatisfactory and had asked for
i
.L

another meeting to discuss the matter in person. They met again on the 19 and on the
following day, Monroe addressed Madison: “I had an interview with Lord Mulgrave. .
.which, I am sorry to observe, presented the prospect of a much less favorable result than
I had anticipated from the previous one. “19 After two formal protests, Monroe was still
awaiting some kind of satisfaction in the fall of 1805. He sent a letter to Lord Mulgrave.
However, since he still had received not even a response to his protests by that time,
Monroe turned his attention to his own government, emphasizing to Madison that the
U.S. needed to adopt “an attitude of menace” with a “determination to execute it if
necessary.”

In other words, the U.S. needed to demonstrate to the European powers

that they meant business.
It was quite clear to Monroe that a resolution between the two parties was
becoming more impossible. The British had no intention of allowing American merchant
ships to trade with the French on any terms.

At the same time, the United States

contended that the British could not and should not interfere with the commercial
interests of neutrals. However, in a letter dated September 25th, Monroe told Madison
that he believed that the British were trying to appease the Americans to a certain extent
by dismissing the cases against ships seized for trading in the French colonies. “It is
evident to those who attend the trials, that the tone of the judge has become more

19 Jam es M o n ro e to Jam es M adison (A ugust 2 0 ,1 8 0 5 ) in The W ritings o f James M o n ro e (N ew York, 1900).
20 Harry A m m on, James M o n ro e & the Quest f o r N a tio n a l Identity (C harlottesville: 19 9 0 ) p. 250.
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moderate, that he acquits whenever he can acquit one of our vessels..

91

By October of

1805, Monroe included the problem of impressment in his discussions with Lord
Mulgrave.

He noted that President Jefferson’s hope that there would be some

conciliation on the part of the British, possibly by making examples of those captains
responsible for seizing American ships, was unfounded.

In fact, Monroe wrote on

October 18 , “Captain Bradley of the Cambrian, whose conduct had been most offensive,
has been promoted . . .to a command of a ship of the line.” On the contrary, it seemed to
Monroe that outrages committed against American ships actually helped Bradley advance
up the ranks of the Royal Navy. Monroe believed this to be the case; although a transfer
to a frigate meant more prize money for an officer, a shift to a ship of the line “may
perhaps be deemed a more important trust by the government.” Clearly, Monroe noted,
Bradley was acting as an agent of the British government when his crew seized American
ships and impressed American sailors and was being duly rewarded for it.

99

And as

noted in the American version of Henry Whitby’s death notice in 1812, he too had been
promoted to the command of the H.M.S. Briton for his “honorable” actions against John
Pierce and the Richard.
Monroe and his family were anxious to return to the United States and had been
given permission to do so in the fall of 1805 by President Jefferson. However, Monroe
felt pressured to remain in London until acceptable terms could be negotiated. He
noticed an increase in the number of American ships taken into custody and the lack of
response from Mulgrave moved Monroe to stay longer than he planned. Monroe further
believed that the British were using the war with Napoleon as a means to an end. “I am

21Jam es M o n ro e to Jam es M adison, S ep tem b er 2 5 ,1 8 0 5 .
22 M on roe to M adison, O ctob er 1 8 ,1 8 0 5 .
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inclined to think that the delay which has been so studiously sought in all these concerns
is the part of a system, and that it is intended, as circumstances favor, to subject our
commerce at present and hereafter to every restraint in their power. It is certain that the
greatest jealousy is entertained of our present and increasing pros-perity, and I am
satisfied that nothing which is likely to succeed, will be left untried to impair it.” No
longer did Monroe believe that the British were likely to appease the United States in
these matters. Instead, his dealings with the British cabinet had led Monroe to conclude
that the British were biding their time, waiting, once again, to see “what the U.S. will
bear.”23
And so, Monroe advised Madison that the time was ripe for the U.S. to resist the
British and their policies. The British had far more to lose than they were willing to
acknowledge. The relationship with the U.S. was essential to their commerce, not to
mention that the British colonies depended on American trade. Was the time right, asked
Monroe, for the U.S. to take a hard stance against both Britain and Spain? Monroe’s
answer was yes. By November, he wrote to his colleagues in Spain and the Netherlands
that he hoped to sail home in time for the President to address Congress.
On January 27, 1806, President Jefferson forwarded to the Senate a set of
documents from the State Department pertaining to American relations with Great Britain
regarding neutral rights. In his report to the President and the Senate, Madison argued
that the measures taken by the British against American ships were “unjustifiable,”
particularly the seizure of vessels, the method of search, which “compel [s] the vessel to
send her papers in her own boat, and sometimes with great danger from the condition of
the boat and the state of the weather,” and finally, the practice of impressing “persons
23 M on roe to M adison, O ctob er 1 8 ,1 8 0 5 .
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from American vessels, sailing under the American flag, on the high seas.”24 Soon after,
President Jefferson prepared to send William Pinkney to London. In the meantime, the
death of William Pitt had brought a glimmer of hope to Monroe who believed that both
Charles Fox, the new Foreign Secretary, and Lord Grenville, held the United States in a
more sympathetic view.
By the summer of 1806, as far as Jefferson was concerned, all talk “of an alliance
with Britain, and the American rapprochement with the mother country that had begun
with Jay’s Treaty a decade earlier now came to an end.”

9A

Instead, Congress passed the

Non-Importation Act of 1806, which banned the importation of British goods also
produced by Americans. This Act would not take effect until November 1806. In the
meantime, Jefferson was preparing to send William Pinkney to work with James Monroe
to come to some sort of an arrangement with the British government that would address
the federal government’s, as well as the American public’s, concerns about the treatment
of their merchant ships at the hands of the Royal Navy.
Monroe was not pleased by the arrival of Pinkney. His presidential ambitions had
fueled his hope that he could negotiate a more favorable commercial arrangement with
the British government. He reported to both Jefferson and Madison during the spring of
1806 that the tide was beginning to turn in favor of the U.S. But, as Ammon points out,
the dispatches sent to the State Department and the White House by Monroe did not
include any kind of settlement regarding impressment. A concession was reached that
would have allowed neutral ships some access to European ports, but before word
24 Jam es M adison, "Report from th e S ecretary o f S tate to P resident Jefferson" in The Annals o f Congress
S en a te, 9 th C ongress, 1st S essio n (January 2 5 ,1 8 0 6 )
25 A m m on, James M o n ro e p. 25 1 .
26 G ordon W o o d , Empire o f Liberty: A History o f the Early Republic, 1 7 89 -181 5. (Oxford U niversity Press,
2 00 9 ) p. 6 44.
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reached Washington, Congress was nearing passage of the Non-Importation Act.
Monroe was able to continue talks with Fox because much of the Act was not going into
effect until November of that year.
The negotiations would not include Charles Fox, however, who became ill during
the summer and died on September 13, 1806. Instead, the British chose Lord Henry
Holland and Lord William Auckland to join the American commissioners, Monroe and
Pinkney, to determine the commercial future of Anglo-American relations. Madison’s
instructions to the two Americans were perfectly clear: there could be no agreement
between the two nations without an end to the practice of impressment. In exchange, the
United States promised to return British deserters on board Americans ships to the Royal
Navy. Ammon argues that given the prominence of this issue in the state department’s
instructions, it was clear that this was the “primary obstacle to a settlement.” While the
British commissioners promised they could come to some sort of arrangement, they
asked the Americans to work for the suspension of the Nonimportation Act as a show of
good faith. President Jefferson announced in his message to Congress on December 3,
1806 his belief that delaying the implementation of the Nonimportation act would “yield
to arrangements of mutual consent and convenience.” Jefferson, therefore, recommended
the “suspension of this act for a reasonable time, on considerations of justice, amity and
the public interest.”

77

While this request was followed, the British promise to end

impressment was not. The Cabinet claimed that they did not believe that the U.S. would
follow through on their promise to return British deserters.
As most scholars have pointed out, Jefferson insisted to Monroe and Pinkney that
ending the impressment of American seamen was one of the most essential parts to
27 T hom as Jefferson to C ongress in Annals o f Congress, 9 th S ession (D ecem b er 3 ,1 8 0 6 ).
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negotiating terms with the British government. It was clear, however, to Lords Auckland
and Holland that any insistence on ending impressment was a non-starter, and they were
able to convince the Americans to table that demand. The treaty as it was eventually
presented to Jefferson was never sent on to the Senate, in part because the problem of
impressment was dropped by Pinkney and Monroe. Hickey views the failure on
Jefferson’s part to overlook the issue of impressment and instead recognize the other
commercial merits of the treaty was a direct cause of the further breakdown in diplomatic
relations as well as the War of 1812.28
In his responses to Henry Whitby’s questioning, Caleb Brewster referred to the
negotiations that began on August 27, 1806 between American commissioners James
Monroe and William Pinkney and their British counterparts, Lord Holland and Lord
Auckland. Monroe served as U.S. minister to Great Britain from 1803 to 1807. In the
summer of 1806, Monroe was joined by William Pinkney, appointed by President
Jefferson as envoy extraordinary to the Court of St. James in the spring of that year.
Monroe and Pinkney were participants in a special mission to resolve the maritime
disputes over neutral rights between the United States and Great Britain, and the talks
that followed were known as the Monroe-Pinkney Negotiations. These negotiations were
the next step in Jefferson’s attempt to deal with the increasing hostilities American
merchant ships and their crews faced as they were sucked into the conflicts between
France and Britain. Again and again, the neutral rights of American ships were violated
by both parties as the Napoleonic Wars waged on. By 1807, conditions were getting
worse for American ships, at risk of having their crews impressed by the British and their
ships seized by both aggressors, France and Britain.
28

Perkins, Cam bridge History p. 1 2 4 -1 2 5
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James Monroe reported the outcome of the Whitby court-martial in a letter James
Madison on April 20, 1807.

Whitby had been acquitted, but Monroe was unable to

provide Madison with more details, as “he had not heard from Mr. [George] Canning
since the decision, and no statement is given in the gazettes, of the proceedings of the
court.”

Monroe noted that he had stayed well out of it, believing that the “more the

management of the trial was left to [the British government], the greater would be its
responsibility.” The Morning Chronicle reported simply on April 21, 1807, that the
Court, having “maturely considered the whole, were of opinion that the charge had not
been proved, and did adjudge Captain WHITBY to be acquitted.”
James Monroe finally returned to the United States, arriving in Norfolk on
December 13, 1807.

His intention was to travel to Washington, D.C. to meet with

Madison “for the purpose of giving you all the information in my power respecting our
affairs with the British government.”31 This included a discussion with Madison about
Foreign Secretary George Canning’s questions concerning impressment and the Jefferson
Administration’s rejection of the Monroe-Pinkney treaty. Monroe, concerned about his
political future, insisted to Madison that he be given the opportunity to protect his
reputation.

He wrote to Jefferson as well, in late February 1808, about the “heavy

censure that had fallen” on him “in the publick opinion. . . in consequence of my having
•

•

signed the British treaty.”

'5 ')

Monroe informed the president that he intended to respond

to Madison’s May 1807 letter in which the Secretary of State had outlined his opposition
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to the Treaty. He feared that his political future was sunk because of his association with
the Jefferson Administration’s perceived abandonment of the impressment issue.
All along, however, Monroe and Pinkney asserted that they were following the
instructions given to them by the State Department.

On July 24, 1807, Monroe and

Pinkney had sent a letter to George Canning requesting a renewal of negotiations
between the U.S. and Britain, with particular attention to be paid to the problem of
impressment. “The effect of this practice is, that a flag of an independant [sic] nation is
being dishonoured, and one of the most essential rights of its sovereignty violated; that
American citizens, either being mistaken for British subjects or assumed to be such
without inquiry, are forced from the quiet pursuits of a lawful commerce into the severe
and dangerous service of a foreign military navy.”
In the wake of the Chesapeake affair, in fact, Monroe had been given instructions
to negotiate for the “entire abolition of impressment from vessels under the flag of the
United States.”

However, when Canning sent a special envoy, George H. Rose, to

Washington that summer, “Jefferson and Madison now reversed themselves, telling that
emissary that they would not insist upon a total end to impressment.”
While Monroe, among others, represented American interests in Britain during
this time, Americans at home were simultaneously responding to the British closer to
home, beginning with the events that began off Sandy Hook in April and continued in the
months that followed. On May 3, 1806, President Jefferson issued a proclamation against
Henry Whitby, as commander of the Leander and ordered that Whitby be apprehended to
stand up for the murder of John Pierce. The Leander, Cambrian and Driver were

33 Jam es M on roe and W illiam Pinkney to G eorge Canning in The W ritings o f James M o n ro e (July 24,
1807).
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prohibited from entering American ports, along with any ships commanded by Whitby
and his cohorts. Jefferson further prohibited any American ships from provisioning the
ships or granting them any other kind of aid.34
Public sentiment clearly reflected the increased rage that Americans felt toward
the Royal Navy and the British government for turning a blind eye toward the national
identity of sailors aboard American ships. Many Americans aimed their hostility directly
toward the Federalists, who made no attempts whatsoever to hide their support for
continuing positive relations with Britain, particularly in the commercial arena.

The

Democratic-Republicans were less unified, some advocating for more strict policies
toward Britain, while others, like Jefferson, wanted a more narrowly focused commercial
attack against Britain.35
Throngs of New Yorkers gathered to remember Pierce, urged by the City Council
whose members hoped that all citizens would “unite with us on this melancholy
occasion.”

Newspapers printed diagrams of the funeral procession that included

Pierce’s brother and shipmates who were followed by Mayor Clinton, the members of
the City Council, other seamen, and “’’citizens, four deep.”

37

The Newport Mercury

reported that “thousands” attended the service, a “great number” of them “seafaring men
with weeds in their hats.”

The participants were to gather at City Hall at 11 o’clock that

morning before the procession was “to move through Wall-Street, Pearl-Street,

34 T hom as Jefferson , Proclam ation Ordering the Arrests o f British Citizens, Henry W hitby, John N airne an d
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Whitehall-Street and Broadway to St. Paul’s Church” where Pierce’s body would be
interred.
The New York press, however, would not refer to the shots fired at Pierce’s sloop
as an “incident.” Instead, the headline read “Murder!” in the Morning Chronicle of April
28th.

“Having captured several outward bound American vessels, within the American

jurisdiction, [the British] have at length consummated their wickedness by the
MASSACRE of a peaceable AMERICAN. ” That American was Jesse Pierce’s brother,
John. The newspaper described the incident as an act of murder. Pierce had been killed
when the H.M.S. Leander “wantonly attacked” the Richard, “within a quarter o f a mile
from the shore—within the American jurisdiction. . . . ” The press reported that this was
a “horrible outrage” that “baffles all comment.”
For over a month after Pierce’s death, American newspapers up and down the
East coast reprinted the details of Britain’s continuing violation of American ships’ and
seamen’s neutral rights.

The tone in the press was clear:

Pierce’s death was the

inevitable consequence of a malicious and hostile blockade of American harbors and
ports on the part of the Royal Navy. Impressment of American seamen and attacks on
merchant ships on the high seas were bad enough. But the death of seaman Pierce added
insult to injury.

The Leander, along with at least two other Royal Navy ships, was

anchored in Sandy Hook, lying in wait, or so it seemed, for American vessels returning
from overseas, hunting down contraband and British sailors masquerading as American
seamen. John Pierce of 55 Mulberry Street in Lower Manhattan, a native of Delaware,
was not lost at sea thousands of miles away from home. He was in American waters in

39 M o rn in g Chronicle (NY), April 2 8 ,1 8 0 6
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his own home port when he was killed as a result of the actions of Whitby and his crew
on board the Leander.
Fraternal organizations, political groups and others quickly resolved to send their
condolences to the family of John Pierce. One of the first was the Tammany Society,
founded in 1786 by William Mooney.

Mooney was a veteran of the American

Revolution, having served in the infantry. He organized the Tammany Society to counter
the existence of the Society of the Cincinnati, the result of Major General Henry Knox’s
desire to create a fraternity of men who had served as officers in the Continental Army.
The Tammany Society had branches throughout the country and had developed into an
important political institution, particularly in New York City, where its members became
vocal opponents of the Federalist Party. To men like Mooney, the Federalists represented
elitism in government, just as the Society of the Cincinnati had represented the elitism of
the military.40 The Tammany Society offered young men in particular the chance to be
part of a fraternal organization. It is not surprising, then, that the Society’s members
would voice their opposition to the conduct of the British in support of hard working men
like those aboard the Richard.

The Tammany Society convened to pass a series of

resolutions, including one to attend the funeral procession and one to request their Grand
Sachem “to communicate, to the relatives of the deceased, a letter of condolence,
expressive of the sentiments of the Tammany Society on this subject.”41
While outwardly showing their support for the suffering of the Pierce family and
all American seamen at risk of being impressed, the death of John Pierce also provided
40 T am m any S ociety. Journal & Rules o f th e Council o f S a ch em s o f Saint T am m any's S o ciety . M anuscript
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the Society with an opportunity to express their opposition to the British and any
American associations with that government. In doing so, the Tammany Society was
striking a public blow at their political enemies, the Federalists. Two of the resolutions
reflected these sentiments: “That this society view with the strongest sentiments of
indignation, the conduct of the British in stationing their ships off our Harbour, and
violating our lawful commerce.” They next resolved, less explicitly but with a clear
target in mind, that “this Society is ready to unbury the Tomahawk, whenever their
COUNTRY’S GOOD requires it.”42
The Chronicle of May 5

reprinted the Tammany Society’s call to order:

“Brothers! The die is cast--the disturbers of the world’s peace have spilt the innocent
blood of your countryman, John Pierce!” Tammany secretary James D. Bissett called
upon the members to wear “bucktails in their hats” and black armbands when they joined
their fellow mourners in the funeral procession. He warned them, however, “to appear
without your tomahawks, your bows or your arrows.” He continued, “You will have
tomahawks well sharpened, arrows pointed and your bows well strung. The enemy are
on our borders. The black belt of wampum, stained with American blood, it now before
your eyes in the great Council- Chamber of the nation.”43 The imagery of Native
American attire and weaponry played a significant role in the workings of the Tammany
Society with regard to class in America, but that imagery could easily translate to a
representation of animosity toward the Royal Navy and the king whose actions fueled the
Revolutionary War itself, George III. Aware of this, the London Morning Chronicle

42 Chronicle Extra (MA), M ay 5 ,1 8 0 6 .
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noted that “at various meetings violent Resolutions were adopted”44 by many
organizations.
tVi

Another of these meetings was held by Federal Republicans on April 26 in the
wake of Pierce’s death.

Members met at Tontine Coffeehouse to pass a series of

resolutions calling for the reinforcement of the defenses of the port of New York. The
members openly criticized the policies of the federal government and its relationship with
Great Britain, resolving “That an Administration which consents to pay money to avoid
foreign insolence, or to prevent the violation of national rights, while it sells and
dismantles its naval force, instead of increasing and preserving it, for the defence of our
ports and commerce, prostrates the national honour, endangers the public safety, and
invites both injustice and injury.”45 Clearly, it did not take long for the incident to
become politicized, at the local, state and federal levels, both inside and outside of New
York City.

The Federal Republicans further advocated that American merchants no

longer provision British ships at Sandy Hook and that the Jefferson Administration
respond to the death of John Pierce “with the adoption of prompt and vigorous measures
to prevent a repetition of such wanton and inhuman conduct, and so vagrant a violation of
our national sovereignty.”46
Just a decade earlier, George Washington had bid farewell to his fellow citizens
as his second term ended, famously warning them against the dangers of political
factionalism:

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought
not to be entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit
44
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of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to
discourage and restrain it.
It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public
administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false
alarms, kindles the animosity of one part against another, foments occasionally
riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which
finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party
passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy
and will o f another. 7
Newspapers became the feeding grounds for both Federalists and DemocracticRepublicans hungry for incidents at the local level to fuel the intense animosity of the
political discourse of the Early Republic. In the same article that carried the headline
“Murder!” with regard to Pierce’s death, the writer continued by focusing not on national
outrage to the event, but instead to criticize the politicization of Pierce’s death by elected
officials, particularly DeWitt Clinton, mayor of the city of New York and his uncle, Vice
President George Clinton, first governor of New York. “We are sorry to be compelled to
remark that this murderous violence, which ought to awaken all the indignation, and to
arouse all the energies of every AMERICAN, has already been rendered subservient to
the purposes of party.”
Why were the Clintons such an affront to solid Americans everywhere? Much of
ft

the front page of May 28 ’s issue of the Chronicle was dedicated to the Clintons.
According to one article, while New York Governor Morgan Lewis managed to
appropriate federal funds for the defense of the city’s harbors, DeWitt Clinton, “with a
view to injure the popularity of Governor Lewis, reported a paltry resolution, to
DEFEND this all important post, by a few Albany sloops and insignificant flotillas/” This
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was the stand the Federalists took against the Jefferson Administration, as well as the
Democractic-Republicans like the Clintons who supported him.
Two days after Pierce’s very public funeral, a “numerous and respectable meeting
of American seamen” took place at Hardy’s tavern on Orange Street. The target of their
ire was not Henry Whitby, the crew of the Leander, the Royal Navy or even the British
government.

Instead, the sailors gathered in the tavern that night made their own

unanimous resolutions, including one:”That the monies paid by Mr. Jefferson, for the
wild lands of Louisiana, would have been better applied in building seventy-four gun
ships.”

The Connecticut Courant reprinted an article “For the Jack-Tars of New York!”

on May 7, 1806, which reported on the seamen’s other resolutions, including one in
which the seamen announced that the “present ruling party have treated the American
Seamen with neglect and injustice—that the Federal party are our Friends, and that they
deserve our thanks for the exertions in our favor.” Clearly, the death of John Pierce had
been co-opted by both sides of the political aisle. Jefferson had ignored the plight of
American sailors for far too long and left them unprotected from ship seizures and
impressment. The sailors did not hesitate to make their criticism of President Jefferson
personal, unanimously resolving, too, that “the president. . . had better be employed in
asserting the rights, defending the honour, and protecting the flag of the country than in
stuffing raccoon skins and dissecting new discovered animals.”49
It took longer for word of the death of John Pierce to reach the London papers
than it did for the British press to recognize that party lines had already begun to color the
story in the United States. “It appears by the American papers that a very great sensation
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has been excited in the United States by an occurrence that lately happened there, but the
accounts are so disfigured by party prejudice, that little reliance can be placed upon
them.”50 Aware of the political nature of American newspapers, the London Morning
Chronicle did not hesitate to remind readers of that fact before providing them with the
details of the Leander affair.
The Morning Chronicle of London described the incident to its readers: “At the
end of April, the Leander, Captain WHITBY, cruizing off Sandy Hook, fired at several
American coasting vessels to bring them to. One of them, the sloop Richard, appearing
to disobey the signal, after an interval of several minutes, a shot was fired, and the ball
killed one JOHN PEARCE, a hand on board the vessel.”51 The rest of the account, based
on the affidavits of Pratt and Jesse Pierce, differed very little from what American papers
described. It was clear, however, that the British position was that the Royal Navy had
the right to board American ships returning from the high seas to search for British
sailors and contraband. Not only that, but the Chronicle also responded to the increasing
accusations in the American press that that Royal Navy had established a blockade at the
port of New York. The evidence? The presence of the Leander and the two other British
ships at Sandy Hook in April was clearly accidental.
However, to justify the actions of Whitby and his crew, the Chronicle continued:
“[N]o one can suppose that British Officers, commanding ships of war, would do so
without instructions, and without good right, seeing as they must know the responsibility
under which they act, and the certain punishment that would overtake them if they
compromised the character of their country with wanton vexations and unauthorized
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aggressions.”52 In other words, since Whitby and his men knew the punishments meted
out by the Royal Navy for disobedience, they would not be foolish enough to take matters
into their own hands and fire upon an American ship without cause.
And the Chronicle clearly recognized the level of feeling expressed once Pierce’s
body was brought ashore, reporting that the emotions of the people were “violently
enflamed.” The mob “carried the body about in procession, and seized a quantity of
provisions intended for the British ships on the station, and carried them off to the Alms
house.” That same day, the London Chronicle printed more details of the night that
Pierce was killed. Once his body reached shore, it “has been exposed all this day at
Burling’s Slip, to thousands of spectators. It is to be lodged tomorrow at the Tontine
coffeehouse or the City-Hall, for public view.” The reprinted letter continued, “The
CO

minds of the inhabitants were wrought up to a pitch of actual madness.”
The rabble-rousing of the seafaring class of Americans did not concern the
British as much as the impact of the case on diplomatic relations between the two
countries. The affidavits of Pierce and Pratt, for example, seemed to justify the actions of
the men aboard the Leander. “There can be no doubt, however, that the shots from the
Leander were fired to make the Richard bring to. There even appears evidence from
Pearce’s [sic] deposition that he did not mean to obey.”54 To the Americans, however,
the attack on the Richard was clearly a violation of their rights as citizens of a country
whose neutrality had been recognized by the British government. Here is the controversy
that would lead the United States and Great Britain to war once again just a generation
removed from the Peace of Paris that ended the American Revolution. Did the Royal
52 M o rn in g Chronicle (London), June 4 ,1 8 0 6 .
53 M o rn in g Chronicle (London), June 4, 1806.
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Navy have the authority, the right to press American sailors into service?

Did the

practice of impressment enflame the emotions of the American public so much that the
federal government had to respond with a declaration of war against the British in 1812?
Did the American public’s understanding of their rights as citizens of a neutral nation
inform their actions in the public square as well as in the press in the years leading up to
the War of 1812?
The meaning of the actions of the crowds of men and women who gathered in the
streets of New York to attend the funeral of John Pierce in 1806 were co-opted by all
sorts of political groups, mainly Democractic-Republican, as examples of the kind of
tyranny that Britain continued to represent. Americans were in danger of being drawn
back into the fold if Federalists had any say in the matter. It was they who continued to
curry favor with the British Crown, not the Republicans. The Republicans represented
the interests of small farmers and other hardworking men of the Republic, not the
interests of greedy merchants who controlled prices and cheated farming and seafaring
communities alike.55 During the years prior to the American Revolution, elites aligned
themselves with merchants, striking out against the British government not because they
opposed their authority, but because local colonial economies were suffering. Up until the
eve of the War of 1812, American newspapers invoked the name of Pierce to symbolize
the injustice of the Royal Navy as impressments continued year after year.
Protests against the Chesapeake-Leopard affair followed in a manner similar to
what happened in New York in 1806 after the death of John Pierce. It is almost
55 Paul Gilje, Liberty on the W aterfro n t: A m erican M a ritim e Culture in the A ge o f Revolution (Philadelphia:
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impossible to find a timeline of the War of 1812 that does not include or even highlight
the Chesapeake-Leopard affair as a major event on the road to America’s second war
with Great Britain. As Paul Gilje has noted, the British attack on the U.S.S. Chesapeake,
which resulted in the death of four Americans, fueled the outrage American maritime
communities felt toward Great Britain all along the eastern seaboard.
The conflict took place in Norfolk, Virginia on June 22, 1807 and led to the
deaths of four men (three that day). Reactions to the death of one seaman in particular,
Robert MacDonald, who died at the Norfolk Marine Hospital on June 25, 1807, followed
a pattern similar to that of John Pierce. “An assemblage of civic officials, military
figures, and common citizens almost 4,000 strong marched through Norfolk streets
following MacDonald’s remains to Christ’s Church.”56 Cray finds that the actions taken
by those who responded to the deaths of those four American sailors, John Lawrence,
James Arnold, and John Shukly (died on board the Chesapeake) and Robert MacDonald
(died days later at Norfolk Hospital) were inspired by their “revolutionary recollections.”
The citizens of Norfolk and Portsmouth met and in heady language, referred to the
“tyranny” of the Royal Navy and the “assassination” of the seamen. They toasted the
“heroes of the Revolution” at a dinner in Norfolk that “attracted close to 700 persons.”
He wonders whether this kind of rhetoric changed the nation’s attitude toward the
American sailor. After all, “British sailors had blasted a broadside against the U.S.S.
Chesapeake, a community afloat in the new republic’s service.” But the jack tars, Cray
argues, were marginalized members of American society in the Early Republic. They
spent most of their time at sea, with a “tenuous attachment to coastal communities.” But
more than that, while they were on the frontlines when on the high seas and therefore
56 Robert E. Cray, Jr., "R em em bering th e USS Chesapeake."
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more vulnerable to the imperial policies of Great Britain than any other group of
Americans, their plight was mostly ignored by the government. What he concludes about
this incident is that the government as well as the public had very short attention spans
when it came to hostilities committed by the British against the maritime community,
particularly those at sea. By December 1807, newspaper publishers shifted focus and
covered the Embargo Act.57

57 Cray, "R em em bering th e Chesapeake," p. 4 4 6 -4 4 9 , 45 6 .
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Chapter III: Conclusions

The antagonism toward the Royal Navy in 1806 and again in 1807 did not come
from public outrage at the deaths of great naval officers or heroes. Instead, John Pierce,
who died aboard the Richard and Robert MacDonald, a crewman aboard the Chesapeake,
were ordinary seamen. They had not performed a heroic deed or saved other men from a
watery death in the open seas. In the case of Pierce, he died not far from shore near
Sandy Hook, fatally injured on deck when the H.M.S. Leander fired at the ship captained
by his brother, Jesse. Robert MacDonald died in similar fashion just over a year later,
again the victim of what Americans believed to be the unwarranted aggression of the
Royal Navy. What is surprising about the public response to these deaths is the economic
class of the men who died. Pierce served aboard a merchant ship. Consequently, his pay
and the conditions on board ship were probably better than those experienced by
MacDonald, who served aboard a U.S. naval frigate. To fill their crews, the Navy looked
to newly arrived immigrants and lower bom men, not drawn by dreams of shipboard
glory, but by the promise of a regular income and, more likely, mm. Cray acknowledges
that there were exceptions, common seamen whose acts of bravery were memorialized in
the popular press and often in song.1
There was another significant difference between the attack on the Richard and
the Chesapeake. The British believed that there were British seamen on board and they
had names.

In fact, the British had complained to the State Department without

satisfaction. Commodore James Barron, captain of the Chesapeake countered that David
Martin (described in official papers as a “native American” or an “Indian looking man”),
1 Cray, "R em em bering th e C hesapeake," p. 4 52.
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William Ware, (an African American) and John Strachan had been impressed and taken
aboard the H.M.S. Melampus.
Jenkin Ratford was a British sailor, but when he joined the crew of the
Chesapeake, he used a false name, John Wilson. The press also reported that Ratford,
who was eventually executed, had been found aboard the Chesapeake, “hid in the coal
hole of that frigate.”2 Ratford stated at his trial in Nova Scotia, that he had “hid in the
coal-hole because of his fear of the Americans making him fight his own country, which
he declared he would not do on any account.” These words certainly are not surprising
given that he was facing execution.3 The crew of the Leopard was following the orders
of Admiral Sir George C. Berkeley, who wanted the desertions to end and to prevent the
Americans from continuing to harbor the fugitives on board their ships. The United
States Gazette reported on June 27th that despite an investigation that determined that
three men wanted by the Royal Navy for desertion were in fact American seamen pressed
into service, and that “the affair seemed to be settled to mutual satisfaction, that the
frigate, Leopard had “poured a whole broadside against the Chesapeake,” killing three
men. 4
Part of the furor over the Chesapeake stemmed from the deaths of innocent
Americans. It was not the men accused of deserting from the Royal Navy who were
injured or killed, but fellow American citizens.

MacDonald’s death notice appeared

throughout the country. The Alexandria Daily Advertiser of July 3, 1807 reported on
both the sailor’s death as well as his funeral, “attended by nearly 4000” in a procession
that ended at “Christ Church, where an appropriate, impressive and patriotic discourse
2 N ew b u ryp o rt H erald (MA) S ep te m b er 2 2 ,1 8 0 7
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was delivered to a most numerous congregation.”5 This followed a pattern similar to
Pierce’s a year earlier, with much fanfare and public participation. At the same time that
MacDonald and the other victims of the Chesapeake were mourned and celebrated, the
commodore of the ship, James Barron, faced a court martial. Newspapers reported that
the vessel was “in every respect unprepared for action.”6 Barron himself conceded that
they were “unprepared and unsuspicious” on board the Chesapeake and able only to
mount a “feeble” defense.7 “As commander, Barron had failed to perform honorably and
protect his crew and his men.

He was found guilty at his court martial and was

suspended from service for five years beginning in 1808.
Cray recognizes that Americans were outraged at the way in which individual
seamen and ships were targeted by the Royal Navy and equated those vile acts with the
tyranny of the Revolution. But he is less convinced that Americans were really all that
bothered by impressment. The focus, he argues, of the petitions and resolutions were
therefore, not against the practice itself. In the case of the Chesapeake, the four men who
were taken off the ship were soon targets of a politicized press, while the Chesapeake
affair, along with the death of John Pierce and the ongoing often strained negotiations
between Britain and the U.S., fueled the Jefferson Administration to take action against
the British much more strongly than it had the previous year with the Nonimportation
Act. The Embargo Act of 1807, passed in December, prohibited U.S. ships from carrying
exports outside the country. The impact, as Paul Gilje points out, was devastating to the
American, not European, economy.
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Rather than leading to war, Jefferson hope that strong action against Britain in the
wake of the Chesapeake affairs would lead to concessions on their part. In some ways,
the federal government’s immediate response was similar to what took place in the wake
of Pierce’s death. Ports were closed to all Royal Navy ships (in the aftermath of Pierce’s
death, the three ships involved were banned from U.S. ports) and as happened in New
York in 1806, American merchants were barred from provisioning Royal Navy ships.
Succumbing to pressure that had been building since the death of John Pierce, the
Jefferson Administration approved the construction of more armed naval ships, small
gunboats that were cheaper to build than frigates.

o

As the U.S. neared war with Britain, however, impressment, and more
specifically, the death of John Pierce and other American sailors “martyred” like him at
the hands of the Royal Navy, were invoked whenever politicians gathered, campaigned or
spoke in favor of war. A gathering of Republicans in Charleston in 1808 ended with
seventeen toasts, among them one to “The 22nd of June, 1807—Poor Pierce’s shade
complains that we are slow, McDonald’s ghost walks unavenged amongst us!”9 Thomas
Jefferson’s son-in-law, John W. Eppes, hoping to win re-election to Congress after a
losing bid the year before, published a plea to Virginia voters in 1812. Outlining the
crimes committed against the U.S. by the British and pledging to support the war effort if
reelected, Eppes including the murder of John Pierce by Henry Whitby among them.10
The National Intelligencer reported on the proceedings of the House of
Representatives in May 1810, including the continuing debates over the proposed

8 A.J. Langguth, Union 1812: The Am ericans W ho Fought the Second W a r f o r Independence (N ew York:
2 0 0 6 ), p. 133
9 N a tio n a l Intelligencer (DC.) N o v em b er 2 ,1 8 0 8
10 N a tio n a l Intelligence (DC), A ugust 1 5 ,1 8 1 2
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reduction to the size of the Army and Navy. Richard M. Johnson, a DemocraticRepublican from Kentucky reminded his fellow congressmen of the injuries committed
against the United States repeatedly by the political maneuverings of the French and the
blatant outrages of the British against American commerce. “I will not go back for
causes to justify a system of resistance. I would not go back to past events, and I would
leave out of the question, if gentlemen wish it, the burning our vessels on the high seas—
the confiscation of our property in port—the imprisonment of our citizens—the murder of
Pierce—the attack upon the Chesapeake—the impressment of our seamen: and still I
should find cause to justify the most energetic measures against France and Great
Britain.”11 Johnson was not ready to argue for war, but instead to support the
enforcement of the Nonimportation and Embargo acts of 1806 and 1807.
As the House continued debates over naval appropriations in January 1812, fellow
Republican, William Lowndes of South Carolina argued against Johnson’s assertion that
five frigates were enough to protect American commerce on the grounds that the eastern
seaboard was already vulnerable to attacks from a much larger fleet of British ships
stationed out of Halifax and the West Indies. More than that was the refusal of the
federal government to allow the ships that Navy did have to take the offensive against
this threat. “The death of Pierce might have been revenged, and the disgrace of the
Chesapeake obliterated if these five frigates had been sent a cruising. We did not want
force but spirit to employ it.”

1 "7

Teddy Roosevelt may have believed that Americans were particularly prepared to
fight the British at sea not in spite of, but because of impressment, Henry Adams offers a

11 N a tio n a l Intelligencer (DC) M ay 2 3 ,1 8 1 0
12 N a tio n a l Intelligencer (DC) March 7 ,1 8 1 2

53

different view of the American navy on the eve of the War of 1812, at least with regard to
ship-readiness. The naval force included only eight frigates of various strength, all of
which had been built, according to Adams, “by Federalist Congresses before President
Jefferson’s time.”

1^

O f those ships that were in service, “few” were in “first-rate

condition.” As far as Adams was concerned, Congress was entirely to blame for lack of
ships and lack of readiness found in the ships of the line. The original plan for the use of
the American navy once war was declared, was to station naval ships outside eastern
ports to protect merchant ships heading from Europe toward those ports with “one to oneand-a-half million dollars a week” in commerce. As for seamanship, however, Adams
wrote that while the American navy demonstrated their inexperience and sometimes plain
dumb luck right from the start of the war, they also proved their ability to outmaneuver
the Royal Navy early on, when the U.S. Constitution made its way up the east coast from
Annapolis to New York and encountered a British squadron sailing from Halifax to New
York. Less than a month later, the Constitution met the Guerriere off Sandy Hook. “In
less than thirty minutes from the time we got alongside of the enemy, she was left
without a spar standing, and the hull cut to pieces in such a manner as to make it difficult
to keep her above water.” Adams noted in his description of the American victory the
level of British arrogance that had led to what he called a “duel” between these two ships.
The American victory, he noted, had to do with the superiority of the American ship in
size and strength, as well as the “better and more intelligent” American seamen and
officers, who had a “passionate wish to repay old scores, [giving] them extraordinary
energy. »

14

13 Henry A dam s, The W a r o f 1 8 1 2 (N ew York: 1 9 9 9 (reprint)), p. 37.
14 A dam s, The W a r o f 1 8 1 2 , p. 39.
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